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Japanese Development Cooperation in a New Era: 












The landscape of international development has changed markedly, with the 
acceleration of global integration and the shaping of the post-2015 development 
framework. This paper discusses the new era of Japan’s development cooperation from 
two perspectives—broader and deeper partnerships with the private sector, as well as 
‘cooperation and competition’ with Asian emerging donors. It proposes ‘network-based 
cooperation’ as a central pillar of Japan’s future development cooperation, based on the 
analyses of the nature of a new wave of internationalization of Japanese manufacturing 
foreign direct investment (FDI) which involves small-and medium enterprises (SMEs), 
as well as the extensive local human and organizational networks accumulated in Asia 
through sixty years of Japan’s official development assistance (ODA). Unique roles of 
Japan as a mature knowledge partner based on international comparative analysis and a 
quality leader in global business activity are also discussed. Japan should leverage its 
distinctive strengths in both the corporate and ODA sectors, and actively embark on the 
new era of development cooperation.  
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1. Changing Landscape of International Development and the Context of Japan’s 
Development Cooperation  
 
In the twenty-first century globalization continues apace, bringing with it increased 
diversity and complexity. The landscape of international development has changed 
markedly since the adoption of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) at the UN 
General Assembly in 2000, where heads of state committed to improving the lives of 
millions around the world. The actors involved in development cooperation have 
diversified and the international development agenda has broadened. As the 2015 
deadline for achieving the MDGs approaches, a lively debate to define the post-MDGs 
development agenda has emerged.  
 
Two developments in particular are worthy of note. First is the dramatic increase in 
private capital flows to developing countries, and the second is the growing presence of 
emerging Asian donors such as South Korea, China, and India. And while the 
importance of development efforts to reduce poverty remains unchanged, the number of 
countries achieving economic growth through active trade and investment with 
emerging economies or through a boom in natural resources is increasing. Particularly 
since financial and economic crises precipitated by the Lehman Brothers scandal of 
2008, investors are turning away from the faltering economies of the developed world 
and looking to emerging economies and developing countries to drive the global 
economy forward by acting as new ‘growth centers’. In this environment, multi-national 
corporations have actively expanded their business activities in emerging economies 
and developing countries, and as a result the interface between business and 
development cooperation activity is growing. Moreover, even European donors, for 
whom the poverty reduction agenda predominated until 2000, have begun to wield 
economic and commercial diplomacy as well as engage actively in partnerships with the 
private sector.1 Without doubt international development cooperation has entered a new 
era.  
 
The domestic environment in Japan has also undergone significant changes over the 
past decades. During the 1990s Japan established itself as the world’s top donor. 
However the fiscal and financial deterioration that followed the collapse of the bubble 
economy caused the country’s Official Development Assistance (ODA) to enter a 
period of waning support and retrenchment. Over a period of 14 years, the initial ODA 
budget (general account) declined continually so that by FY 2013 it represented just 
48% of its peak amount of 1997. By 2007 Japan had slid down to fifth place on the list 
of major donors compiled by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Public opinion 
                                                        
1 Poverty reduction was the chief cornerstone of the UK’s aid program. However as the growth 
agenda emerged in 2007, the country’s Department for International Development (DfID) began to 
strengthen its partnerships with the business community. In late 2013 DfID Secretary Justine 
Greening invited representatives from British business community on an official visit to Tanzania 
where she praised the trade, investment, and economic development that would be generated by 
the UK’s Prosperity Partnership with the government there. Also, in early 2013, as part of a 
government-wide restructuring of ministries and agencies, the Canadian government merged its 
ODA implementing agency CIDA, which was established in 1968 with a strong focus on poverty 
reduction, into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade to create the Foreign Trade and 
Development Ministry (DFATD). Both these developments represent policy initiatives taken to 
restructure aid organizations to pay greater attention to the interface between development and 
economic and commercial diplomacy. 
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turned inwards and the proportion of the general public that indicated strong support for 
Japan’s foreign aid and economic cooperation declined sharply between 2002 and 2004 
(Cabinet Office of Japan, Public Opinion Survey on Diplomacy 2002, 2003, 2004). To 
exacerbate the situation, the Great East Japan Earthquake struck in March 2011 causing 
untold devastation and suffering, and the reconstruction of the areas affected placed a 
further heavy fiscal burden upon the government’s shoulders.   
 
Still we have good reason not to be overly pessimistic about the future of Japan’s ODA. 
Viewed in a more positive light, we could understand the first decade of the twenty-first 
century as a period when Japan took stock of its experience and built the foundations for 
the next stage of its development cooperation. Faced with fiscal stringency, a series of 
ODA reforms were pushed through as part of a government-wide administrative and 
financial reform.2 These changes aimed to increase the transparency and efficiency of 
aid, and moreover, to build an organizational structure that provided more timely 
assistance on the ground in support of active aid partnership efforts that were unfolding 
in developing countries.  
 
In particular, between 2002 and 2006, a series of measures and reviews were introduced 
by the Board on Comprehensive ODA Strategy to make aid programs more effective, 
focused, and strategic. The creation of this multi-stakeholder board was in follow-up to 
recommendations made by the Second Consultative Committee on ODA Reform, a 
private advisory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, which served between May 
2001 and March 2002. The Strategy Board was chaired by the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs and had Professor Toshio Watanabe, the dean of Takushoku University, acting 
as the alternate. Reform continued under the Advisory Council on International 
Cooperation (2007 to 2009), a second private advisory body reporting to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs and chaired by Professor Toshio Watanabe. While scope for 
improvement still remains, the government implemented a package of extensive and 
far-reaching institutional reforms during this decade-long period. These reforms 
encompassed the delegation of decision-making power to the field; the creation of ODA 
taskforces in major partner countries; the strengthening of the ODA evaluation system; 
the establishment of the New Japan International Cooperation Agency (New JICA) by 
consolidating most ODA operations under the management of one agency; the 
strengthening of the International Cooperation Bureau in MOFA by replacing its 
‘scheme’-based divisions with country or region-based ones; and the formation of an 
ODA special committee in the Upper House of the Diet . 
 
Furthermore, the outpouring of support from various countries, organizations, and 
individuals following the Great East Japan Earthquake provided an opportunity for 
Japanese citizens to appreciate the benefits of international cooperation as aid recipients, 
and this experience reminded the populous of the importance of inter-dependence and 
mutual help. The disaster was so devastating and painful that the whole nation united to 
support recovery and reconstruction efforts for the Tohoku region. Alliances between 
                                                        
2 A succession of expert panels with stakeholders from all quarters of the government were called on to 
discuss the role of ODA and make recommendations: the Council on ODA Reforms for 21st Century 
(April 1997 to January 1998), Council on Yen Loan Schemes (January to August 2000), the Second 
Consultative Committee on ODA Reform (June 2001 to March 2002), the Board on Comprehensive ODA 
Strategy (June 2002 to June 2006), the Advisory Council on International Cooperation (March 2007 to 
February 2009) and others were formed with the International Cooperation Bureau (formerly Economic 
Cooperation Bureau) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) acting as the secretariat. 
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NGOs, business, local communities, and the Self-Defense Forces were forged, and 
innovative activities such as social business and social investment to support people in 
the affected areas began to emerge. The results of the Public Opinion Survey on 
Diplomacy conducted in October 2011 reflected the change in mood brought on by the 
disaster, with the proportion of respondents in favor of economic cooperation 
recovering from the lowest level recorded at the beginning of 2000s. The reason given 
by many of supporters was the generosity shown by the world to Japan following the 
Great East Japan Earthquake.3 This episode undoubtedly provides a valuable lesson for 
Japan’s future development cooperation and indicates that a new era has begun even 
within Japan.  
 
Against such background, H.E. Mr. Fumio Kishida, Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
announced his intention to revise the current ODA Charter (adopted by the Cabinet in 
August 2003) in his ODA policy speech given at the Press Club in March 2014 4. 
Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs convened the Advisory Panel to the 
Minister to Review the ODA Charter, chaired by Professor Taizo Yakushiji, Professor 
Emeritus of Keio University and consisting of multi-stakeholder members. The 
Advisory Panel which met four times during late March-June 2014 and submitted the 
recommendations to the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Currently, the drafting work is 
underway by the Ministry’s International Cooperation Bureau, and a series of public 
consultations are being held in different localities of Japan simultaneously. 
 
With these developments in mind, in the following sections, I would like to explore this 
new era of Japan’s development cooperation from two perspectives. The first is that of 
partnerships with the private sector. In recent years, as the interface between 
development and business has grown, the Japanese government has introduced a series 
of new measures to promote partnerships with the private sector within its ODA 
activities. What does this development hold for the future? How do these new 
partnerships differ from the public-private partnerships of the past? The second 
perspective is that of ‘cooperation and competition’ with Asia’s emerging donors. Their 
rise offers an excellent opportunity for cooperation in the region to disseminate Asian 
development thinking to the international community. At the same time, it requires that 
Japan clearly articulate its comparative advantage over Asia’s emerging donors. What 
features distinguish Japan’s development cooperation from that of China or Korea? 
 
 
2. Partnerships with the Private Sector within Development Cooperation 
 
In response to the accelerated outward foreign direct investment (FDI) of Japanese 
firms triggered by the recent financial crisis, from 2011 Japan began investing heavily 
                                                        
3 In the Cabinet of Japan’s Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy conducted in October 2011, 27.4% of 
respondents were in favor ODA.  While this proportion is well below the 41.4% who responded 
positively in 1993, it represents a significant recovery in support compared to 2004 when the proportion 
in support of ODA hit a low of 18.7%. The three main reasons given by respondents in favor of ODA in 
the 2011 survey were: ‘we should continue providing ODA to support those countries that came to 
Japan’s aid following the Great East Japan Earthquake (60.8%)’; ‘ODA is an important tool for 
advancing Japan’s foreign policy’ (50.3%); and ‘Japan should use its technological know-how and 
experience to solve environmental and other problems in developing world’ (48.6%). 
4 Foreign Minister Fukuda gave a speech at the Press Club on March 28, 2014, entitled “An Evolving 
ODA: For the World’s Future and the Japan’s Future.”  For details, please see: 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/ic/ap_m/page3e_000169.html 
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into strengthening partnerships with the private sector within its ODA activities, 
primarily targeting Japanese firms active in developing countries. Economic 
cooperation agencies like the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the 
Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and the Overseas Human Resources and 
Industry Development Association (HIDA)5  have long supported Japanese business, 
forging public-private partnerships as the core part of their operations. Now, notably 
even MOFA and JICA―which previously had demonstrated reluctance in supporting 
individual firms and rarely became involved in any business proposals presented to 
them―have started to use ODA budget to support new private sector partnership 
activities, including support for the overseas expansion of small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs).  Another interesting development is that METI and related agencies 
have begun to promote Base of the Pyramid (BOP) business6 to Japanese companies to 
broaden the interface between the private sector and development. Targeting the BOP 
presents a new business model in which core business operations aim directly at solving 
the social and development challenges faced by the poor in developing countries and 
emerging economies.  
 
Preoccupied with the hollowing out of domestic industry, national and local government 
in Japan had until recently taken a cautious stance toward supporting the overseas 
expansion of SMEs. However, from 2010 onwards a new wave of internationalization 
began, and growing numbers of manufacturing SMEs have shown strong interest in 
pursuing fresh opportunities abroad. These SMEs have demonstrated not only a 
willingness to take on new risks, but also have started to take action (or give serious 
consideration to) to move their production bases overseas without the support of a 
parent company, which was rarely the case in the past. Consequently, the government 
shifted its policy away from a cautious stance to one that provided active support to 
these pioneers (SME Support, JAPAN 2010).7 It is also important to note the factors 
that contributed to Japan’s growing interest in the BOP business, which was also 
precipitated by the 2008 financial crisis. Chief among them was the rise of emerging 
economies and developing countries as the ‘growth centers’ of the global economy and 
the perception that these centers also represented future markets full of new middle 
class consumers that would compensate for the sluggish demand of the developed world. 
Added to this, there was a greater awareness regarding the need to extend support to 
socially and ethically responsible business practices (Sugawara, Ohno & Tsuchiya 
2011). 
 
The motivation for JICA and MOFA to move forward with private sector partnerships 
utilizing ODA is linked to a number of different but related factors, such as the 
increased importance of private capital in poverty reduction and sustainable growth in 
developing countries; the potential application of private sector technology, know-how, 
and innovation, including that of Japanese companies to solve global challenges in 
environment, climate change, infectious diseases, food security, and energy; and not 
                                                        
5 HIDA was created in April 2012 through the merger of the Japan Overseas Development Corporation 
(JODC), the Association for Overseas Technical Scholarship (AOTS), and other related structures within 
METI.  
6 Around 40 million people are estimated to be living on less than $3,000 a year (i.e. the Base of the 
Pyramid or BOP). Recently the number of private sector firms developing products and services targeted 
at this low-income group has been increasing. 
7 A major turning point was the Small and Medium Sized Enterprise White Paper 2010, which called for 
the need ‘to harness global economic development for Japan’s growth’ and ‘to actively promote 
internationalization of SMEs in challenging conditions abroad’ to further develop Japan’s SMEs. 
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least, the strong perception that such partnerships would be mutually beneficial for 
developing countries and Japan.8 This line of thinking was already evident when the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DJP) was in power. For example, the ODA Review (June 
2010, MOFA) compiled under the guidance of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Katsuya 
Okada posited the concept of ‘enlightened national interest’ and the Noda government 
also announced the New Growth Strategy (National Strategy Office, Cabinet decision in 
July 2012). Going one step further, when the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) came into 
power at the end of 2012, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled the Japan Revitalization 
Strategy: Japan is Back (Headquarters for Japan’s Economic Revitalization, Cabinet 
decision in June 2013), which advanced global outreach as one of its three action plans. 
The global outreach action plan set specific numerical targets for infrastructure exports 
and the overseas expansion of SMEs and leading medium-sized enterprises and 
envisages ‘the strategic use of economic cooperation’.  
 
Table 1 provides examples of recently introduced ODA modalities to support 
partnerships with the Japanese private sector. Needless to say, economic cooperation 
agencies such as METI and the Organization for Small and Medium Enterprises and 
Regional Innovation (aka SME Support, JAPAN) have long supported Japanese 
businesses across the board. JETRO and HIDA are also boosting measures to support 
the overseas expansion of Japanese SMEs by strengthening one-stop consultation 
services and providing feasibility studies and hands-on support for export promotion 
and outward FDI. 
                                                        
8
 Refer to the ODA section of the MOFA website and the Public Private Partnerships section of the JICA 
website. 
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Table 1: ODA Modalities to Support Partnerships with the Private Sector 
Area of Support ODA Modality & Launch Date Purpose
Private-Sector Cooperation
Volunteer System (FY2012- , JICA)
Support global human resources
development through the dispatch of
private sector professionals as
volunteers
Grant aid Non-project grant aid (FY2012- ,
MOFA)
Provide SME's products that contribute to
the socio-economic development of




in partnership with local
governments and for econonmic
reacctivation (FY2012
supplementary budget- , JICA)
Support the socio-economic development
of developing countries, by mobilizing








Preparatory survey for BOP
business (FY2010- , JICA)
Pilot projects for disseminating
private sector technologies for the
socio-economic development of
developing countries (FY2013- ,
JICA)
Private Sector Investment Finance
(PSIF) (FY2012, after piloted from
FY2010, JICA)
Pilot and dissemination Support the introduction and
dissemination of a company’s products,
technologies, and systems
Fact-finding surveys Support the design of infrastructure PPP
projects that seek concessional loans or
PSIF support
Support the design of pro-poor, BOP
business
Fact-finding surveys Verify developmental needs for a
company’s technologies and products in
developing countries, and support project
formulation
Support information gathering and
project formulation prior to outward FDI
into developing countries
Needs survey (FY2012- , MOFA:
commissioned to JICA) ;
Project formulation survey
(FY2012- . MOFA: commissioned
to JICA; FY2014- transferred to
JICA )
Preliminary survey for preparing
for SME otward FDI (FY2012- ,
JICA)
Pilot and dissemination Feasibility study and pilot projects
for disseminating SME's
technologies in developing
countries (FY2012- , JICA)
Verify the suitability of  SME's products
and technologies in developing country
and  disseminating them
Partnership with Local Governments
Human resource
development
Japan Centers (in six overseas
locations, JICA)
Train local business managers and
workers focusing on Japanese business
management
Financial cooperation Provide financial support (loans and
equity) to private sector projects that
contribute to the socio-economic
development of developing countries
 
*The Japanese fiscal year runs from April to March 
(Source) Compiled by the author using information available in Japanese from the JICA website. JICA 
also has a variety of other collaborative partnerships with developing country partners at the local level in 
training programs and grassroots cooperation that are not included here. 
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New Wave of Internationalization 
 
So what are the features of the new wave of internationalization? Broadly speaking, up 
to now Japanese manufacturing FDI has passed through three stages; the first was from 
the 1970s to the mid 1980s, the second spanned the latter half of 1980s and the third 
began in the 1990s (Kubota 2012). Since the 2008 global economic crisis, however, we 
can say that Japan has entered a fourth new stage of internationalization.9 
 
From 1970s to the middle of 1980s, trade friction between Japan and its Western trading 
partners was the primary factor behind outward FDI by Japanese business. As part of an 
export substituting strategy to avoid the tariff and the non-tariff barriers set up by the 
US and Europe, Japanese business shifted its manufacturing base to various Western 
countries. Later, in response to the export-oriented industrialization policy adopted by 
the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs), Japanese companies began moving 
into export processing zones (EPZ) in these economies. The appreciation of the yen 
after the 1985 Plaza Accord caused Japanese domestic wages and production costs to 
soar compared with the West and other Asian countries, and by the late 1980s Japanese 
outward FDI expanded further, shifting labor-intensive production processes to 
Southeast Asia in pursuit of lower labor costs. The advance of China’s open-door policy 
and its economic reforms prompted a global FDI rush into the country from the 1990s. 
In addition, the progress of bilateral and regional trade liberalization presents companies 
with further incentives to restructure production and export bases to take advantage of 
new global and regional business opportunities. 
 
Notably throughout these three stages of Japanese FDI, large manufacturing companies 
played a central role, irrespective of the target destination or motivating factors behind 
the move. In many instances, SMEs bound in a subcontracting relationship with larger 
parent companies would be asked to follow in the expansion overseas. Once on the 
ground, these Japanese businesses would create production networks, maintaining 
domestic Japanese-style subcontracting relations and production partnerships.  Efforts 
were also made to integrate local businesses into the Japanese production networks as 
supporting industries. During these first three stages of FDI, however, only a few 
manufacturing SMEs expanded into global markets without the support of such 
Japanese-style production partnerships. 
 
By contrast, following the 2008 financial crisis, traditional Japanese-style production 
relations crumbled, and an increasing number of SMEs began to seek new opportunities 
overseas, making management decisions and taking risks to establish overseas 
production bases independently of large parent companies. As Table 2 shows, the 
primary motivation for the outward FDI of Japanese manufacturing companies shifted 
away from cost reduction—usually the search for cheaper labor costs— to developing 
new markets for the parts and components industry. In pursuing new markets, acquiring 
new customers among Japanese and non-Japanese business alike became more 
important than maintaining domestic subcontracting relations abroad, although cases of 
this still remained. The search for new markets indicates the beginning of a new era of 
internationalization for Japanese business in the sense that even small urban factories or 
                                                        
9 For more details refer to Kenichi Ohno, The Overseas Expansion of Manufacturing Small and Medium-
Sized Enterprises: Policy Recommendations, Chapter 1 in The Expansion of Japanese-style 
Manufacturing in Asia: Recommendations and Strategies from a Case Study of Vietnam, Asia Pacific 
Institute of Research, March 2013. 
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machi koba that possess nothing more than high-level skills and technology may have 
to face a situation where they have to expand overseas. Another change that marks the 
shift to a new era is the recent increase in outward Japanese FDI into Southeast Asia in 
order to avoid the rising risks of doing business in China. Until now China has without 
doubt been the top destination for Japanese FDI, but according to various surveys 
conducted in 2012, Thailand is becoming an ever-more popular destination, followed by 
Vietnam and Indonesia (Shoko Chukin Bank 2013, Kinki Bureau of Economy, Trade 
and Industry 2013 and others). 
 
Table 2: Trends in Japanese Outward FDI (Manufacturing) 
Period Main Developments in FDI Main Traits Exchange Rates
• Trade friction with the West
prompts the Japanese
manufacturing industry to shift
production overseas thus
avoiding tariff and non-tariff
barriers imposed on exports
• The establishment of EPZ and
SEZ by Asian NIEs
Latter half of
1980s
• A gradual shift away from
investment in Asian NIEs in
favor of ASEAN countries
• The transfer of labor-intensive
production processes to
Southeast Asia allowing the
manufacturing industry to
benefit from lower wages
• The Plaza Accord of
1985 sees the yen
appreciate against the
dollar
• Expansion into the Chinese
market as Chinese economic
reforms progress and the
country joins the WTO in 2001
• Greater capacity demonstrated
by enterprises and the growth of
industrial clusters in Asia
• FDI to ASEAN increases
• Interest grows in India and
Myanmar
• SMEs step up overseas
production independently of
Japanese big business
• A rapid increase of FDI to China
• FDI to Asia recovers in 2000
having experienced a sharp drop
between 1998 and 1999.
• A rapid increase in FDI to
North America and Europe
• An increase in FDI to Asian
NIEs
• A floating exchange
rate system is
introduced in 1973
• The yen appreciates
against the US dollar
Post 2010 • Lehman Shock of






• The Asian Financial
Crisis of 1997 weakens
the yen
• Production and export bases
continue to restructure under
the demands of globalization and
ASEAN economic integration
  
(Source) Prepared by the author, based on Kubota Norio’s The Overseas Expansion of Production by 
Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Ch. 2, p. 33, Chart 2-2 in Internationalization Strategies of Small- 
and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Nukada Haruka and Yamamoto Satoshi eds., Doyukan, 2012. 
 
 
How do the New Partnerships Differ from Traditional PPPs? 
 
Japan has long provided cooperation that combined trade, investment, and development 
assistance (or ODA) to East Asia, successfully incorporating partner countries into a 
dynamic production network that has contributed to the economic progress of the region. 
This phenomenon is often referred to as the East Asian Miracle and Japan’s METI has 
hailed this successful mix as the Japanese ODA Model (METI, 2005). Japan’s ODA has 
played a catalytic role for private sector development on a number of fronts. It has 
upgraded manufacturing bases through concessional financing for infrastructure. It has 
established systems to strengthen the functioning of the market economy. And, it has 
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built human resources through decades of technical cooperation. In turn, the improved 
investment climate has attracted FDI from Japan and elsewhere, encouraging trade 
based on the import and export of raw materials as well as of finished goods, thus 
contributing to the development of partner countries (Watanabe and Miura 2003).10 
 
In this model, the main driver is the overseas expansion of large Japanese corporations 
and affiliated SMEs within a traditional Japanese production relationship. In contrast, 
the new wave of outward FDI regards developing countries and emerging economies 
not only as destinations for production bases but also as important consumer markets. 
Further, the players are not limited to large corporations and their affiliates but involve a 
wide range of businesses, including SMEs acting independently of big business. In a 
new era, where Asia has become the center of global production and an important 
market, it is all the more important for FDI companies to build a strong network of local 
talent and organizations to succeed. Japan needs to move beyond the traditional PPP 
and form a new style of partnership with the private sector, both domestically and 
abroad. BOP business provides a perfect example of how this can be achieved. Here, 
businesses meet the challenge of providing goods and services to serve the basic needs 
of the poor by designing innovative measures to overcome the ‘BOP penalties’ of 
access, affordability, and availability faced by their clients. To achieve this, the 
localization of business activities, including research and development, planning, and 
distribution and sales, is indispensable. The same holds true for SMEs expanding 
abroad. In general, small factories in Japan possess superior technology, but they face 
enormous structural constraints in terms of their ability to devise business strategy, 
draw up sales and marketing plans or handle foreign languages. Thus, in cases where a 
Japanese manufacturing SME plans to expand overseas independently, it needs to 
compensate for such resource constraints with local talent and organizational support. 
Only then can a small urban factory hope to grow into a global enterprise (Ohno 2013).  
 
In sum, to build the local networks described here, the new partnerships require a much 
broader and deeper interaction with the partner country which takes them beyond the 
traditional PPP based on a combination of investment, trade, and aid that Japan has 
practiced until now. 
 
 
3. Asia’s Emerging Donors: ‘Cooperation and Competition’  
 
Japan’s aid program has several distinctive features that originate from its own 
development experience. It is characterized by its support for the self-help efforts of 
partner countries which places a strong emphasis on promoting sustainable growth over 
‘charity’; a respect for country ownership that is governed by a cautious approach to 
applying political conditionality; and economic cooperation that is based on seeking 
mutual benefit or creating a win-win partnership. These features are also discernible in 
the aid being offered by emerging Asian donors like Korea and China. Each of these 
three countries began their aid programs in response to a unique set of diplomatic and 
economic considerations while they were still aid recipients themselves and engaged in 
catching up economically with the West. In fact even now China maintains firmly that it 
                                                        
10 Also see the Interim Report of the Advisory Council on Internationalization (January 2008) chaired by 
Prof. Toshio Watanabe. As a private advisory body to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Council was 
convened between March 2007 and February 2009 to discuss and propose recommendations for basic 
policy on international cooperation from a diverse range of perspectives. 
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is not an aid donor, but rather a partner country that provides ‘South-South 
Cooperation’. Along with Japan, Korea, and China, other advanced economies in 
ASEAN such as Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and India have also launched aid 
programs.  They too possess the dual experience of being an ‘aid donor’ and ‘aid 
recipient’ and it is this double exposure which has shaped Asian development thinking, 
making it distinct from that of Western donors whose aid has been characterized as an 
act of giving ‘from a wealthy country to poor one’. 11  Deep at the roots of Asian 
development thinking is the concept of self-help, which respects the policy ownership 
of the recipient country and supports the country’s capacity development to enable it to 
graduate from receiving aid.  
 
In 1961, three years after it had joined the OECD, Japan became a member of the 
Development Assistance Group (DAG), the precursor to the DAC.  Until Korea joined 
in 2010, Japan was the sole Asian member of the committee.  During this period, in the 
eyes of Western donors, Japan represented a ‘foreign’ presence and at times Japan felt 
uneasy too about discussions driven by European or American priorities and agendas.12  
Moving forward half a century, Korea has used its DAC membership to its advantage 
and made a national commitment to communicate its development experience widely to 
the international audience, as the adoption of the 'Seoul Consensus' at the G20 Seoul 
Summit of 2010 and its hosting of the 4th High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness 
(Busan HLF) in 2011 demonstrate. As for China (a non-DAC member), the Forum on 
China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) which started in 2000 symbolized a shift from aid 
that disseminated political ideology to one that focuses on supporting commercial and 
economic interests. This in turn has triggered strong interest as well as concern among 
Western donors. In light of these developments, there is now greater awareness in the 
international community that Asian and Western donors differ in their development 
thinking and approaches to aid.13  In addition, there is wider recognition that China’s 
practice of linking aid, trade, and investment and supporting the economic 
independence of developing countries originated in Japan’s aid program, which started 
in the postwar period when the country was still receiving aid from the West and 
international organizations (King 2007, Brautigam 2009, China-DAC Study Group 
2009).   
 
The rise of Asian emerging donors is a welcome development for Japan, which has 
tended to be isolated within the international development community and the DAC 
until now. Yet at the same time, the presence of other donors with a similar orientation 
                                                        
11  While Eastern and Central European countries are also emerging donors, the type of Asian 
development thinking mentioned here is not evident among them. This difference is to a large extent 
connected to the European Union membership process, which requires the harmonization of their values 
and standards with those held by the major European economies. 
12 The Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) introduced by the World Bank and IMF in the late 
1990s heavily emphasized social development at the expense of infrastructure development. In this 
context and at DAC, Japan argued the importance of economic growth for poverty reduction and 
presented processes and cases in where infrastructure development benefited the poor. 
13 Saidi and Wolf (2011) distinguish between the aid given by Asian donors, which has a strong element 
of economic cooperation or ‘international development investment’ from that provided by Western 
Europe, which can be described as ‘international development assistance’ with an emphasis on 
responding to humanitarian needs. A discussion has also begun that suggests comparing donors under the 
framework of ‘Asian vs. Western’ is more valid than ‘traditional vs. emerging’ (International 
Symposium: Styles of Foreign Assistance, May 27-28, 2011, Seoul discussion organized by KAIDEC , 
KOICA, and Ewha Womans (sic) University; and also Sato and Shimomura (2012)). 
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demands a greater effort on Japan’s part to clarify its comparative advantage in the 
development arena. The scale and speed of China’s economic cooperation are much 
greater than that of Japan’s ODA. Korea’s ODA, while still small in terms of budget (a 
seventh of Japan’s in 2012 based on net disbursement) became very active under the 
leadership of the former president, Lee Myung-bak, who engaged the country in a 
Knowledge Sharing Program (KSP) that compiles its development experience on a 
national level and disseminates it to developing country partners. It is of great 
significance that Asian donors cooperate and communicate Asian development thinking 
to the international community. But while doing so, Japan should make more robust 
efforts to call global attention to its comparative advantage and the unique contribution 
that it can make to progress in developing countries. In the next section, I will discuss 
the distinctive features of Japan’s development cooperation and private sector activity. 
 
Intellectual Support based on International Comparative Analysis 
 
Compared to China and Korea, Japan is a ‘mature donor’.  Japan’s key strengths lie in 
its wealth of experience and capacity to conduct international comparative analysis of 
best practices drawn not only from its own development experience, but also from that 
of advanced East Asian economies. Japan also has the experience and ability to manage 
the process of knowledge co-creation, through joint work with its developing country 
partners. As the internal and external environment of a country changes over time, it is 
difficult to apply Japan’s own development experience directly to the issues facing 
today’s developing countries. The same applies to Korea’s experience, which is typified 
by the New Community Movement (Saemaul Undong), export promotion and the 
creation of five-year plans, or China’s experience, which includes the creation of 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ). Although Korea has demonstrated a powerful ability to 
communicate globally, its intellectual support has focused on sharing and showcasing 
its own development experience with interested developing countries. China also has 
not yet reached the stage where it can share any development experience other than its 
own. In this respect, as a mature donor that has supported East Asia’s development over 
many decades, Japan is well positioned to conduct policy dialogue and provide 
intellectual support that incorporates an international comparative analysis of the 
development experience of other countries. Japan also has access to a wealth of human 
resources and organizational networks trained and accumulated through decades of past 
ODA, particularly in the ASEAN region. It is precisely this expertise and human and 





What plays an essential role here is ‘network-based’ cooperation.14  In Asia, along with 
China and Korea, other former recipients of Japanese aid such as Singapore, Malaysia, 
and Thailand, have graduated and are now in the position to assist other countries. From 
the perspective of Korea and China, who actively communicate their development 
experience as a part of national policy, there may be little incentive to venture into a 
partnership with Japan. However from Japan’s perspective, it is important to take a step 
                                                        
14 The idea of ‘network-based cooperation’ is largely attributable to Araki Mitsuya, Chief Editor of The 
International Development Journal, and taken from his recommendations for International Cooperation 
in a New Era. For details see  
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/pdf10/ODAMT/1st/handout2(Mr. Araki).pdf 
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further and promote network-based cooperation, particularly with the leading 
economies of ASEAN, so it can make use of the knowledge and human networks that it 
has built over many decades.   
 
For example, at the request by the former prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kwan Yew, 
JICA implemented an eight-year long project to increase the country’s industrial 
productivity (Productivity Development Project) through which a large number of 
public and private sector experts were trained. Now these Singaporean experts are 
actively engaged in international cooperation in neighboring countries and in Africa too. 
JICA also dispatched a Malaysian investment advisor to Zambia as the third country 
expert, who made important contributions toward improving Zambia’s investment 
climate. With the first-hand experience in investment promotion he gained having 
served as the deputy director general of the Malaysia’s Industrial Development 
Authority (MIDA), the advisor was able to offer specific policy recommendations and 
help the country attract FDI from Malaysia. Furthermore, under the ongoing industrial 
policy dialogue with Ethiopia conducted by JICA and the National Graduate Institute 
for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan invited Malaysian and Thai practitioners to Ethiopia 
to share their experience with investment and export promotion. JICA also organized a 
study tour to send Ethiopian policy makers and practitioners, all of whom were officials 
of the Ministry of Industry, the Ethiopia Investment Authority, and other related 
agencies, to Malaysia. There the participants were able to learn the specifics of the 
country’s industrial development, knowledge that contributed to speeding up the 
revision of Ethiopia’s investment laws.15   
 
The year 2014 marks sixty anniversary of Japan’s ODA. Through decades of technical 
and financial cooperation, Japan has accumulated extensive human and organizational 
networks in Asia and other partner countries. Now is the time for Japan to 
institutionalize these individual achievements and lead the shift from conventional 
cooperation designed to create ‘something out of nothing’ to the next-generation 
development cooperation that would build ‘more from something’ by drawing on the 
assets accumulated through its past ODA to Asia and by working with emerging donors 
as key players. By acting as the hub of an intellectual network and partnering with the 
emerging Asian and ASEAN economies that have recent aid recipient experience, Japan 
can position itself to engage actively in intellectual support and policy dialogue with 
latecomer Asian countries such as Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and the others 
developing countries around the world. 
 
Japan as a Quality Leader in Global Business Activity 
 
With the rise of the emerging economies in Asia, the competition for global markets has 
become even fiercer for Japanese companies. Japanese business has a reputation for 
being exceedingly cautious about new investments, leading to slow decision-making. 
Certainly compared to China and Korea, this seems to be the case. This attribute and 
some others are rooted largely in the Japanese business model.  As Table 3 shows, 
                                                        
15 For details see the reports on the 15th Ethiopian Industrial Policy Dialogue (August 2013) and the Joint 
JICA-GRIPS-Malaysia Mission to Ethiopia (July 2013) (Japanese) http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/af-
growth/support_ethiopia/document/2013.07_ET/ 




compared to global investment practice, where pursuing short-term profit and favoring 
flexible and fluid partnerships is the norm, Japanese outward FDI differs significantly in 
several respects.16  Japan has a vibrant manufacturing industry and Japanese companies 
demand high standards of quality control or Quality, Cost, and Delivery (QCD) from 
every partner at every stage of the process; from the procurement of raw materials and 
parts to production and aftercare services. For this reason, Japanese companies need to 
thoroughly examine the potential and risks associated with their investments. Once a 
company decides to investment abroad, however, it will remain committed for long 
term and continue business operations in the country. Needless to say, the company 
makes extensive efforts to develop local supporting industries, train industry human 
resources and transfer technology to its local counterparts.  
 
Although these qualities of the Japanese business model slow the decision-making 
process in companies, in another sense, these unique characteristics may prove to be 
Japan’s strength. Indeed there are developing country leaders and government officials 
who already recognize the potential benefits of these features.  On a visit to Japan 
during the Fifth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD V), 
the Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn invited Japanese industry, in 
particular the manufacturing sector, to invest in Ethiopia. From Japan he looked for 
‘quality’ not ‘quantity’ in investment. More than scale, the values, labor ethics, and the 
practice of kaizen that Japanese companies would bring with them were of interest to 
him. Top local government officials from Vietnam also remarked that while FDI is 
pouring into the country from around the world, only Japan has committed to building 
local capacity while pursuing profit. The officials expressed great interest in learning 
how to make their provinces more attractive to investment from Japanese businesses.  
 
Table 3: Characteristics of Japanese Outward FDI  
Strong manufacturing-orientation The manufacturing industry leads over any other category
of activity, e.g. real estate, commercial or mining operations
Pride in a long tradition of manufacturing
or 'manufacturing spirit'
Deep sense of pride on the factory floor; deeply dedicated to
quality and ensuring customer satisfaction
Long-term commitment Slow to enter into frontier countries, but once committed
will remain despite being faced with difficulties
Provision of partner support Provide training to local firms and human resources to meet
high standards demanded by QCD
Good legal compliance Relatively good compliance with local labor, tax, and
environmental laws & regulations
 
(Source) Ohno, Kenichi, Ethiopia as a Business Manufacturing Partners: The Potential Observed from 
Bilateral Policy Dialogue, June 2013. 
 
So rather than striving to compete only on quantitative terms, such as scale and speed of 
expansion or pricing in a fiercely competitive market, Japanese companies should 
capitalize on the very features of that have made their business model respected and 
replicated, and stake their claim as global leaders of quality manufacturing. To achieve 
this, it becomes increasingly important for Japanese business to intensify and sustain 
                                                        
16 See the Kenichi Ohno’s presentation materials for the Ethiopian Business Investment Seminar held 
jointly by JETRO and the Ethiopian ambassador to Japan on June 3, 2013 for TICAD V at 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum/pdf13/Etiopia_seminar@JETRO/policydialog_J.pdf 
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their involvement in nurturing local organizations and talent, especially in the area of 
production management systems and manufacturing industry human resources. 
 
 
4. Recommendations for Network-Based Cooperation 
 
Increasing global integration has blurred the lines between overseas and domestic 
activities. Moreover, the expansion of corporate activities into emerging economies and 
developing countries has broadened the interface between development cooperation and 
business activity. On another front, it is encouraging to witness the growth of human 
resources and organizational networks built in Asia through Japan’s long-standing ODA 
and economic cooperation. Building on a relationship of trust that has been established 
over decades of cooperation with Japan, Asian development partners are increasingly 
becoming players of a new era of development cooperation. 
  
As business activities in emerging economies and developing countries expand and 
mature, the ‘localization’ of Japanese companies will become critically important. For 
business to thrive, partnerships forged with local networks of human resources and 
organizations built through ODA will prove indispensible. In this new era of 
cooperation, Japan should leverage the strengths it possesses through network-based 
cooperation. The networks I refer to here are multifaceted ones that encompass 
partnerships with the private sector; the network of people and organizations built up 
throughout Asia by Japanese ODA; and the Asian network that has been mobilized for 
the development partnership between Asia and Africa. The network can extend further 
to include local governments in Japan that support SME development, NGOs, and other 
relevant actors, making them key players in a new era of development cooperation too. 
Embarking on such an endeavor would elevate Japan’s development cooperation and 
place it squarely at the center of the country’s basic national policy and at the same time 







< Japanese Language > 
 
Kinki Bureau of Economy, Trade and Industry (2013). HEISEI 24 NENDO 
CHUSHOUKIGYOU NO KAIGAI TENKAI SHIEN NI MUKETA KANSAI TO AJIA NO 
TAME NO CHOUSA KENKYU or Research Study to Promote Strategic Economic 
Exchange between the Kansai Region and the Emerging Economies of Asia Support 
Focusing on FY2012 Support for SME Overseas Expansion, February 2013 
 
Kubota, Norio (2012). CHUSHOUKIGYOU NO KAIGAI SEISAN TENKAI or The 
Overseas Expansion of Production by Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises in Chapter 
2 of Nukada Haruka and Yamamoto Satoshi eds. Chushoukigyou no Kokusaika 
Senryaku or Internationalization Strategies of Small- and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
Doyukan 
 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (2005). WAGA KUNI KEIZAI KYOURYOKU 
 16 
NO SEIKOU KEIKEN WO FUMAETA: JAPAN/ODA MODEL NO SUISHIN or The 
Promotion of the Japan ODA Model Based on the Success of Japan’s Economic 
Cooperation, Interim Report by the Economic Cooperation Group, Subcommittee on 
Economic Cooperation, Industrial Structure Council, Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry, July 2005. 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2010). HIRAKARETA KOKUEKI NO ZOUSHIN – SEKAI 
NO HITOBITO TO TOMONI IKI, HEIWA TO HANEI WO TSUKURU, ODA NO 
ARIKATA NI KANSURU KENTOU SAISHUU TORIMATOME or ODA Review Final 
Report: Enlightened National Interest: Living in Harmony with the word in Peace and 
Prosperity, June 2010. 
 
Ohno, Izumi, (2013). MONOZUKURI CHUUSHOUKIGYOU NO 
KAIGAISHINSHUTSU – SHIENSAKU, JIREI, TEIGEN or The Overseas Expansion of 
Manufacturing Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Support Measures, Case Studies, 
and Recommendations, Chapter 2 in NIHONGATA MONOZUKURI NO AJIATENKAI: 
BETONAMU WO JIREI TO SURU SENRYAKU TO TEIGEN or The Expansion of 
Japanese-style Manufacturing in Asia: Recommendations and Strategies from a Case 
Study of Vietnam, Asia Pacific Institute of Research (Foundation), March 2013. 
 
Ohno, Kenichi, (2013). MONOZUKURI CHUUSHOUKIGYOU NO KAIGAI 
SHINSHUTU or The Overseas Expansion of Manufacturing Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises: Policy Recommendations, Chapter 1 in NIHONGATA MONOZUKURI NO 
AJIATENKAI: BETONAMU WO JIREI TO SURU SENRYAKU TO TEIGEN or The 
Expansion of Japanese-style Manufacturing in Asia: Recommendations and Strategies 
from a Case Study of Vietnam, Asia Pacific Institute of Research (Foundation), March 
2013. 
 
Shoko Chukin Bank (2013). CHUUSHOUKIGYOU NO KEIEI KAIZENSAKU NI 
KANSURU CHOUSA or Study to Identify Measures to Improve the Management of 
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Shoko Chukin Bank, Kinki Bureau of Economy, 
Trade and Industry, January 2013.  
 
Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, Japan (2010). CHUUSHOUKIGYOU 
HAKUSHO 2010 DO HAN or The White Paper on Small and Medium Enterprises 2010 
Edition, Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, Japan Small Business Research 
Institute, April 2010. 
 
Sugawara, Hideyuki, Ohno, Izumi and Tsuchiya, Shino (2011). BOP BIJINESU 
NYUUMON: PA-TONA-SHIPU DE SEKAI NO HINKON NI IDOMU or BOP Business 
101: Confronting Global Poverty Through Partnerships, Chuokeizai-Sha, Inc. 
 
Watanabe, Toshio and Miura, Yuji (2003). ODA (SEIFU KAIHATU ENJO); NIHON NI 





Brautigam, Deborah (2009). The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 17 
 
China DAC Study Group (2009). Development Partnerships for Growth and Poverty 
Reduction, Conference report held in Beijing, China, between October 28-29, 2009.  
 
King, Kenneth (2007). China’s Aid to Africa: A View from China and Japan, mimeo.  
 
Saidi, Myriam Dahman and Wolf, Cristina (2011). Recalibrating Development Co-
operation: How Can African Countries Benefit from Emerging Partners?, OECD 
Development Centre Working Paper, No. 302. 
 
Sato, Jin and Shimomura, Yasutami, eds. (2012). The Rise of Asian Donors: Japan's 
Impact on the Evolution of Emerging Donors, Routledge-GRIPS Development Forum 
Studies. 
 
 
